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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Or Sheffet: "Utilitarian Models of Privacy-Loss and Social Choice"
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SUMMARY:Or Sheffet: "Utilitarian Models of Privacy-Loss and Social Choice"
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>CRCS Lunch Seminar</strong></p><p><strong>Date:</strong> Monday, September 29, 2014<br><strong>Time:</strong> 11:30am – 1:00pm<br><strong>Place:</strong> 33 Oxford St., Maxwell Dworkin 119</p><p><strong>Speaker: </strong>Or Sheffet, <span class="st">Postdoctoral Fellow, CRCS, SEAS, Harvard University.</span></p><p><strong>Title:</strong> Utilitarian Models of Privacy-Loss and Social Choice</p><p><drupal-media data-entity-type="media" data-entity-uuid="3d1128e1-fe3a-4858-bb19-295e3ee17b20"></drupal-media><br><strong>Abstract:</strong><br>This talk surveys two independent works. In its first part we discuss the problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish and utility-maximizing agents. Previous works [GR11, Xiao13, NOS12, CCKMV13] avoid the need to provide an explicit formalization of privacy concerns by designing mechanisms that adhere to the worst-case notion of differential privacy. Our work takes the complimentary approach and is aimed at a better understanding of the behavior of agents when the privacy concerns are explicitly formalized. Specifically we characterize the behavior of selfish utility-maximizing agents in a toy-setting where agent A's incentive to discover agent B's secret type is the result of some payments between B and A.<br><br>In the second part of the talk we discuss the problem of Social Choice, where n individuals are picking together one alternative out of m possible alternatives using a social choice function -- a function that takes as input the n individuals' preferences among the alternatives and outputs a single chosen alternative, called the winner. Inspired but newly formulated ideas as to the role of clustering [BBG09], we view social choice as a proxy for maximizing social welfare.  Our premise is that agents have (possibly implicit or latent) utility functions, and the goal of a social choice function is to maximize the social welfare — i.e., (possibly weighted) sum of agent utilities — of the selected alternative. We will also discuss current, open ended, work as to maximizing utility of a matching / stable matching.<br><br>Based Joint work with Yiling Chen and Salil Vadhan (WINE'14) and Craig Boutillier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simi Haber, Tyler Lu and Ariel Procaccia (EC' 12).<br><br><strong>Biography:</strong><br>[[{"fid":"342151","view_mode":"default","type":"media","attributes":{<span id="docs-internal-guid-81efb63f-ad69-c678-def7-beba5cc88ddc" style="font-size: 19px; font-family: Arial; color: #000000; background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;">“style”:”float:right;”,</span>"height":"263","width":"217","alt":"Or Sheffet","title":"Or Sheffet","class":"media-element file-default"}}]] I am a fellow of Harvard's CRCS and a member of the Privacy-Tools program. Prior to my post-doc at Harvard I was a research fellow in the Simon's Institute for the Theory of Computer Science as a member of the "Theoretical Foundations of Big-Data" program. I have a B.SC in math and computer science from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel, and a M.Sc in computer science and applied math from the Weizmann Institute of Science. I have a PhD in computer science from Carnegie Mellon University, where I had the honor of being advised by prof. Avrim Blum. My research interests lie in differential privacy, algorithmic game theory, machine learning in general and clustering in particular.<br><br></p>
LOCATION:Maxwell Dworkin 119
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTART:20140929T153000Z
DTEND:20140929T170000Z
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