Upadhyay S, Joshi S, Lakkaraju H.
Towards robust and reliable algorithmic recourse. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 2021;34 :16926-16937.
Publisher's VersionAbstractAs predictive models are increasingly being deployed in high-stakes decision making (eg, loan approvals), there has been growing interest in post-hoc techniques which provide recourse to affected individuals. These techniques generate recourses under the assumption that the underlying predictive model does not change. However, in practice, models are often regularly updated for a variety of reasons (eg, dataset shifts), thereby rendering previously prescribed recourses ineffective. To address this problem, we propose a novel framework, RObust Algorithmic Recourse (ROAR), that leverages adversarial training for finding recourses that are robust to model shifts. To the best of our knowledge, this work proposes the first ever solution to this critical problem. We also carry out theoretical analysis which underscores the importance of constructing recourses that are robust to model shifts: 1) We quantify the probability of invalidation for recourses generated without accounting for model shifts. 2) We prove that the additional cost incurred due to the robust recourses output by our framework is bounded. Experimental evaluation on multiple synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed framework.
Parbhoo S, Joshi S, Doshi-Velez F.
Learning-to-defer for sequential medical decision-making under uncertainty. Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning: Workshop on Neglected Assumptions in Causal Inference (ICML). 2021.
Publisher's VersionAbstractLearning-to-defer is a framework to automatically defer decision-making to a human expert when ML-based decisions are deemed unreliable. Existing learning-to-defer frameworks are not designed for sequential settings. That is, they defer at every instance independently, based on immediate predictions, while ignoring the potential long-term impact of these interventions. As a result, existing frameworks are myopic. Further, they do not defer adaptively, which is crucial when human interventions are costly. In this work, we propose Sequential Learning-to-Defer (SLTD), a framework for learning-to-defer to a domain expert in sequential decision-making settings. Contrary to existing literature, we pose the problem of learning-to-defer as model-based reinforcement learning (RL) to i) account for long-term consequences of ML-based actions using RL and ii) adaptively defer based on the dynamics (model-based). Our proposed framework determines whether to defer (at each time step) by quantifying whether a deferral now will improve the value compared to delaying deferral to the next time step. To quantify the improvement, we account for potential future deferrals. As a result, we learn a pre-emptive deferral policy (i.e. a policy that defers early if using the ML-based policy could worsen long-term outcomes). Our deferral policy is adaptive to the non-stationarity in the dynamics. We demonstrate that adaptive deferral via SLTD provides an improved trade-off between long-term outcomes and deferral frequency on synthetic, semi-synthetic, and real-world data with non-stationary dynamics. Finally, we interpret the deferral decision by decomposing the propagated (long-term) uncertainty around the outcome, to justify the deferral decision.
2109.06312.pdf Zhang H, Dullerud N, Seyyed-Kalantari L, Morris Q, Joshi S, Ghassemi M.
An Empirical Framework for Domain Generalization in Clinical Settings. Conference for Health, Inference, and Learning (CHIL) 2021. 2021.
Publisher's VersionAbstract Clinical machine learning models experience significantly degraded performance in datasets not seen during training, e.g., new hospitals or populations. Recent developments in domain generalization offer a promising solution to this problem by creating models that learn invariances across environments. In this work, we benchmark the performance of eight domain generalization methods on multi-site clinical time series and medical imaging data. We introduce a framework to induce synthetic but realistic domain shifts and sampling bias to stress-test these methods over existing non-healthcare benchmarks. We find that current domain generalization methods do not consistently achieve significant gains in out-of-distribution performance over empirical risk minimization on real-world medical imaging data, in line with prior work on general imaging datasets. However, a subset of realistic induced-shift scenarios in clinical time series data do exhibit limited performance gains. We characterize these scenarios in detail, and recommend best practices for domain generalization in the clinical setting.
2103.11163.pdf Jia F, Mate A, Li Z, Jabbari S, Chakraborty M, Tambe M, Wellman M, Vorobeychik Y.
A Game-Theoretic Approach for Hierarchical Policy-Making. nd International (Virtual) Workshop on Autonomous Agents for Social Good (AASG 2021). 2021.
Publisher's VersionAbstract
We present the design and analysis of a multi-level game-theoretic model of hierarchical policy-making, inspired by policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our model captures the potentially mismatched priorities among a hierarchy of policy-makers (e.g., federal, state, and local governments) with respect to two main cost components that have opposite dependence on the policy strength, such as post-intervention infection rates and the cost of policy implementation. Our model further includes a crucial third fac- tor in decisions: a cost of non-compliance with the policy-maker immediately above in the hierarchy, such as non-compliance of state with federal policies. Our first contribution is a closed-form approximation of a recently published agent-based model to com- pute the number of infections for any implemented policy. Second, we present a novel equilibrium selection criterion that addresses common issues with equilibrium multiplicity in our setting. Third, we propose a hierarchical algorithm based on best response dynamics for computing an approximate equilibrium of the hierarchical policy-making game consistent with our solution concept. Finally, we present an empirical investigation of equilibrium policy strategies in this game as a function of game parameters, such as the degree of centralization and disagreements about policy priorities among the agents, the extent of free riding as well as fairness in the distribution of costs.
aasg_2021_paper_9.pdf